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Abstract: The paper develops a Kaleckian macroeconomic model which discusses the conditions 
that may lead to an external debt crisis in a small developing economy fully integrated to global 
goods and financial markets. The focus is on how policy rules affect the stability of the economy. 
Two kinds of policy rules are discussed, namely an inflation rate target and a real exchange rate 
target, implemented through an interest rate operation procedure (IROP). It is argued that in both 
cases  the  evolution  of  the  real  exchange  rate  should  be  closely  monitored  to  avoid  external 
instability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this paper is to discuss, from a Post-Keynesian (PK) perspective, how different 
monetary policy rules affect growth and stability in a small developing economy fully integrated 
to the international goods and financial markets. For a fully globalized economy we understand 
one in which the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) and the dynamic (weak) version of 
purchasing power parity apply. We discuss the implications of two alternative monetary policies 
for the stability of the economy in this context. One alternative is to adopt a Taylor-rule with a 
view to achieving a certain desired level of inflation (an inflation target regime), while the real 
exchange rate endogenously adjusts. The other is that the government sets a real exchange rate 
target while the equilibrium inflation rate is endogenous. 
 
The  paper  intends  to  contribute  to  the  growing  PK  literature  addressing  the  inter-relations 
between policy choices and stability when international flows of financial capital play a central 
role in the domestic macrodynamics, forcefully constraining the degrees of freedom of monetary 
policy
1. Such a focus is chiefly motivated by the Latin American experience. In the last three 
decades Latin America has become much more integrated to international trade and financial 
markets
2. This made it more complicated for the region to foster growth and stability at the same 
time, in spite of the alleged beneficial effects of financial openness
3. In many countries, like 
Argentina,  Chile  and  Uruguay,  financial  liberalization  and  the  appreciation  of  domestic 
currencies in the 1970s was a critical force leading to the devastating 1982 debt crisis, which 
opened the Latin American “lost decade”.  The same combination can be found in the nineties 
contributing  to  explain  the  crisis  of  Mexico  (1994),  Brazil  (1999),  Argentina  and  Uruguay 
(2002).  
                                                 
1 PK open economy models have been recently revisited by  Blecker (2010; see also Blecker, 1998 and 1999). 
Setterfield (2004 and 2006), Hein and Stockhammer (2007) and  Lima and Setterfield (2010) have emphasized the 
impact of different policy rules on the stability of the economy. Meirelles and Lima (2006) and Lima and Meirelles 
(2007) focused on the stability of the debt to capital ratio. Such a concern with stability is also tributary to the 
classical Minskyan discussion of financial fraglity (Minsky, 1975; Taylor and O’Connel, 1985; Dymski and Pollin, 
1994; Foley, 2003). 
2 See on this ECLAC (2001), Ocampo (2015, 2010), Stallings and Perez (2002) and Frenkel and Ros (2006). For a 
concise  presentation  of  the  centre-periphery  approach  that  stresses  the  external  constraint  on  growth  in  Latin 
America see Prebisch (1976). 
3 See Ffrench-David and Griffith-Jones (1997), Ffrench-Davis (2000) and Frenkel and Taylor (2006), Gala (2008) 
and Medeiros (2008).   3
 
In  the  mid-2000s  the  external  constraint  was  considerable  eased  in  some  Latin  American 
countries
4 due to the vigorous expansion of the world economy, along with improving terms of 
trade for several commodities. But the Latin American economic history and the 2008 world 
crisis suggest that external instability is by no means a matter of the past. In addition, several 
studies  of  PK  persuasion  have  pointed  out  that  widespread  financial  openness  and  capital 
mobility have tended to make the world economy more and lot less unstable (see Arestis, 2010; 
Dimsky, 2010). Therefore, the concern with growth, external constraints and the exchange rate 
would probably remain in the macroeconomic research agenda of Latin America for a long time 
to go. 
 
The paper is organized in two sections besides this introduction and the concluding remarks. 
Section 1 presents the basic model giving particular attention to the dynamics of the external 
debt. Section 2 discusses the conditions for equilibrium in the external debt under two different 
monetary rules, namely inflation target and real exchange rate target. It is argued that in both 
cases the Central Bank should closely monitor the evolution of the real exchange rate in order to 
avoid the emergence of an explosive situation in the external front. 
 
1. Macroeconomic Dynamics 
 
1.1 The goods market 
 
We assume an open economy in which the role of the government is confined to define either an 
inflation target or a real exchange rate target, and then set the nominal interest rate compatible 
with this objective. Although the model admits the possibility of using fiscal policy (see below) 
we will not explore this avenue. We focus instead on an interest rate operation procedure (IROP) 
as the key instrument of macroeconomic policy (Setterfield, 2006). This is consistent with the 
                                                 
4 The impact of the expansion of the world economy has not been uniform across Latin America. Countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which are well endowed with natural resources, experienced a positive shock. On the 
other hand, the small Central American countries, whose comparative advantage depends largely on cheap labor, 
suffered from declining terms of trade and increasing Chinese competition in the US market (ECLAC, 2008).   4
main point addressed in the paper -- the effects of monetary policy in the stability of a small open 
developing economy. 
 
Taking  as  a  point  of  departure  the  basic  macroeconomic  identities  (1)  and  (2)  below,  and 
assuming that workers do not save, we obtain: 
 
(1)  NX I C Y + + =  
(2)  P W Y + =  
(3)  P s W C ) 1 ( - + =  
 
Y is GDP, C is aggregate consumption, I is total investment, NX are net exports, P are profits, W 
are wages and s (0 < s < 1) is the exogenous savings rate. All variables are defined in real terms.  
 
The rate of growth of the capital stock (investment per unit of capital,  K I g º ) is a function of 
the  difference  between  the  expected  profit  rate  (r
e)  and  the  real  interest  rate  (ir),  plus  an 
autonomous  component  (g0)  which  can  be  broadly  seen  as  reflecting  the  Keynesian  “animal 
spirit” (and which may also account for autonomous public expenditure).  
 
(4)  ) ( r
e i r h g g - + = 0 ,  s h < < 0  
 
Based  on  the  Fisher  equation,  the  real  interest  rate  can  be  approximated  by  the  difference 
between nominal interest rate (in) and the inflation rate (p): 
 
(5)  p - @ n r i i  
 
Real net exports per unit of capital ( K NX b º ) are a function of the real exchange rate, defined 
as  p ep q * =  (where p is the domestic price level, p* foreign prices and e the nominal exchange 
rate), and the propensity to import (m), according with the following equation: 
 
(6)  aq m b + - = , m > 0, a > 0   5
 
Combining equations (1) to (6) allows for finding the equilibrium profit rate r (where r = P/K) 
and  the  equilibrium  rate  of  capital  accumulation  g  (where  g  =  I/K)  as  functions  of  the  real 
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Rearranging terms in (7) and (4) gives: 
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Equation (8) can be written as an IS curve (equation 9) : 
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Consistent  with  the  PK  approach  adopted  in  the  paper,  equation  (9)  does  not  contain  any 
reference to potential output, Okun Law or the natural rate of unemployment (Lavoie, 2009). 
Moreover, the real exchange rate affects the growth rate of exports, not just its level
5.  
 
Equilibrium  in  the  goods  market  may  not  be  sustainable  depending  on  the  dynamics  of  the 
external sector. Our subject is an economy that has little room for maneuver in a system highly 
integrated in terms of trade and financing, which must be concerned with its foreign debt. This is 
the point addressed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
5 This rate effect is due to the specification of net exports in equation (6), as suggested by Basu (1997) and Blecker 
(2010).  
   6
1.2 The debt to capital ratio 
 
External equilibrium requires not only Balance-of-Payments equilibrium but also the stability of 
the  debt  to  capital  ratio  of  the  economy.  We  assume  that  the  external  debt  is  issued  in  the 
international markets at the nominal international interest rate i* plus a risk premium R. There is 
an infinite capital supply at the interest rate (i* + R). In the rest of the paper we will assume R = 
0, which strongly simplifies the analysis and does not compromise the main objective of the 
paper - to discuss the relation that exists between policy rules, growth and stability. Domestic 
firms and consumers have no constraints on access to financial lending at the domestic interest 
rate. 
 
The change in the total nominal debt (in the currency of the Home country) depends on net 
exports and the payment of interests on the accumulated debt: 
 





+ - - =   
 
In equation (10) p represents the domestic price level and p* is the international price level. Note 
that  D p p D dt Dp d & & + = ) ( and  hence p D D
pdt
Dp d
+ = & ) (
,  where  dots  on  the  variable  indicates 
derivatives with respect to time (vg .  D dt D d & º ) ( ). Therefore the evolution of the real external 
debt D (expressed in units of the borrowing country product) may be written as follows: 
 
(11)  ( ) p - + - - = q i D K m aq D * ) ( &  
 
The real debt to capital stock ratio is d = D/K. The rate of growth of d  ( ( ) d d d / / ˆ dt d º ) is given 
by: 
 
(12) g D - = ˆ ˆ d .  
   7
By dividing equation (11) by D, and using (12), we obtain the equation of motion of the real 
external debt to capital ratio (in terms of the Home country product): 
 
(13)  ( ) g q i aq m - - + - = p d d * &  
 
Recalling that g is a function of the real interest rate and q, then the evolution of d depends too on 
these two variables.  
 
1.3 UIP and PPP 
 
In a world economy featuring highly liquid financial markets the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition should hold in equilibrium. According to this condition the difference between the 
domestic and international nominal interest rates equals the expected rate of devaluation (i.e. the 
expected rise in the nominal exchange rate, 




n e i i ) + = *  
 
With backward-looking expectations, the expected rate of devaluation falls when the effective 
rate of devaluation rises. Assuming  e j e
e ) ) ) / 1 (- =  and using (14), then we can fin the effective 
rate of devaluation as a function of the difference between the foreign and domestic interest rates: 
 
(15)   ( ) n i i j e - = * ) , j > 0 
 
We assume that the weak (or dynamic) version of the principle of purchasing power parity (PPP) 
holds ( 0 ˆ = q ). This requires that nominal exchange devaluations compensate for the difference 
between the domestic and international inflation rates ( * p p - ). By log-differentiating the real 
exchange rate q = p*e/p we have:  
 
(16)  0 ˆ * ˆ = - + = p p e q  
   8
Last but not least, we need an equation for the inflation rate. We will assume that it responds to 
two  variables  related  to  a  key  dimension  in  PK  models,  namely  the  role  of  the  distributive 
conflict in inflation. From one hand, inflation is related to the real interest rate ir. A lower ir 
favors  the  expansion  of  investment,  consumption  and  employment,  and  this  boosts  wage 
demands
6. On the other hand, inflation also depends on the real exchange rate. A depreciation of 
the real exchange rate implies a rise in the price of imported inputs and consumption goods. If the 
mark-up is constant, more expensive inputs would lead to higher prices (“pass-through effect”). 
In addition, if some of the imported goods are part of the consumption basket of workers, then the 
latter will demand higher nominal wages with a view to avoiding real losses. Both effects fuel 
inflation (Blecker 1999; Damill and Frenkel, 2009).  
 
Thus, the inflation rate will be a function of the real interest rate and the real exchange rate, 
( ) p p - - = n i v q u ~ ~  or: 
 
(17)  n vi uq- = p ,  ( ) v v v ~ 1 ~ - º  > 0 and  ( ) v u u ~ 1 ~ - º  > 0. 
 
Using equations (14), (15) and (17) in (16) we get: 
 
(18)  0 *) ( * ˆ = + - - - = n n vi uq i i j q p  
 
 The equilibrium real exchange rate will be given by: 
 
(19)  ( )
u





where  * * ji z + º p  and j > v. Using (19) in (17) we get: 
 
(20)  n ji z - = p  
 
                                                 
6 The assumption is that a rise in the real interest rate is efficient in reducing output and labor demands, thereby 
curbing inflation. This assumption does not always hold, as Lima and Setterfield (2009) have argued.   9
The rate of economic growth (from equations 9 and 19) can be written as: 
 
(21)  n i g g b - = ~ , where  
 
( ) [ ] u Cu Ba z Bm A g + + - º ~  and  ( ) ( ) j C Bau v j + + - º
- 1
1 b . 
 
So far we have a differential equation for the evolution of the debt to capital ratio (equation 13) 
and functions for the inflation rate (equation 20) and the real exchange rate (equation 19), along 
with a set of given parameters (a, s, h, m, g0, p*, i*, u, v, j, A, B and C). But there is still one more 
endogenous variable whose behavior remains unspecified, namely the domestic nominal interest 
rate.  We  assume  that  the  government  defines  the  IROP  procedure  in  accordance  with  two 
alternative  policies:  inflation  target  and  real  exchange  rate  target.  The  implications  of  these 
alternatives are the topic of the next sections.  
 
2. Inflation Target and Real Exchange Target: Implications for Growth and Stability 
 
2.1. Price and external stability under inflation target 
 
We will firstly assume that the government adopts a strict inflation target (p ) policy: the Central 
Bank takes decisions as regards the nominal interest rate according with a simple Taylor rule
7. 
This assumption reflects the fact that inflation target combined with a fluctuating exchange rate 
regime has been increasingly adopted in many Latin American countries since the nineties. 
 
(22)  ) ( p p a - =
dt
din , a > 0 
 
Equations (13) and (22) form a 2x2 system of differential equations. Using (19), (20) and (21) in 
(13), and (20)  in (22), we can rewrite the system as follows: 
 
                                                 
7 Clearly, other more complex monetary rules can be devised, but we have worked with the simplest one in order to 
focus on the interplay between price stability and external sustainability.   10 
(23)  ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( * ) ( n n n n i g i i q i i aq m - - + - = p d d &  
 






The Jacobian is given by: 
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The subscripts i in the variables denote partial derivatives with respect to the nominal interest rate 
(in). Since a and j are positive, a sufficient condition for having a stable equilibrium is that: 
 
(26) SC =  0 * < - - g q i p   
 
The  previous  expression  (computed  at  the  equilibrium  values)  defines  the  stability  condition 
(SC). A negative SC produces stability, while a positive SC implies a negative determinant and 
hence a saddle point equilibrium. In the latter case, except from the very special case in which the 
initial values of i and d are precisely on the stable path, neither inflation target nor a constant debt 
to capital ratio would be attained. 
 
In equilibrium the inflation rate is equal to the inflation target and therefore  p = - n ji z . From 
this  we  can  find  the  nominal  interest  rate  in  equilibrium  and  (using  equation  19)  the  real 
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An interesting question is how the target set for the inflation rate affects the stability of the 
economy. Taking the derivative of the SC with respect to the inflation target renders: 
 





















This expression is mot likely to be negative.  Therefore, a higher inflation target tends to reduce 
SC  and  increase  the  stability  of  the  system.  Conversely,  if  a  conservative  Central  Bank 
independently pursues a too low rate of inflation, this may give rise to a sharp appreciation of the 
real exchange rate and to an explosive situation in the external front. 
 
In other words, in the specific conditions defined by a close integration to world markets, the 
Central Bank must keep an aye on the real exchange rate when it defines its inflation target. 
Otherwise the result would be growing instability and an ensuing debt crisis.    
 
2.2. A special case: perfect foresight with inflation target 
 
An interesting alternative scenario is when perfect foresight is assumed. This corresponds to the 
case in which j = -1 in equation (15), which implies that the expected rate of devaluation equals 
precisely the effective rate of devaluation. In this case, the foreign and domestic real interest rates 
are equal, and then it will be true that  p p + - = * * i i . This requires that the real exchange rate 
instantly “jumps” to its new equilibrium value ( )( ) ( ) [ ] * * 1 1 p - - + = i i v u q n  in response to any 
difference in the real interest rates, thereby rendering a new system of differential equations: 
  
(31) ( ) ( ) n n n n n i g vi i u i q i i aq m - + - + - = ) ( ) ( * ) ( d d &  






The equilibrium values in the new system are the following: 
 
(33)   p p + - = * * i i
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(34) 
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The trace of the system is  a p + - - g q i*  and the determinant is  ( ) g q i - -p a * . Note that if 
g q i - -p * is negative, then the determinant is negative as well and we have a saddle point 
equilibrium. If on the other hand  g q i - -p * is positive then the determinant is positive and the 
system unstable. Therefore in both cases the system will not reach a stable equilibrium. The 
international economy is populated by two types of countries: some of them are in a virtuous path 
of growth with an increasingly lower debt to capital ratio, while others move towards explosive 
deficits in the external front. In none of the two cases the inflation target would be attained at the 
end of the day. Paradoxically, full integration to the financial markets plus rational expectations, 
which are usually considered as conditions for stability, makes the attainment of the inflation 
target  an  impossible  task.  This  occurs  because  the  IROP  is  ineffective  as  an  instrument  for 
channeling the economy towards its equilibrium path.  
 
Although the previous case represents an extreme situation that it is unlikely to be found as such 
in the real world, it helps to understand the problems of small open economies (particularly in 
Latin America) that have been particularly vulnerable to large swings in international lending. As 
has been recently stressed by Ocampo et al (2009, p. 105): 
   13 
“counter-cyclical interest rates policy goes against the logic of pro-cyclical swings in parity 
interest rates. By trying to increase domestic interest rates during booms, when parity rates tend 
to fall, the central bank would generate a great inducement to additional capital inflows, which 
would reinforce the tendency of the exchange rate to appreciate”.  
 
A similar conclusion has been reached in a recent study by ECLAC (2010):  
 
“In the region’s experience, the real exchange rate —a fundamental macroeconomic prices when 
it comes to making decisions relating to production and spending on tradable goods— behaves in 
an extremely procyclical manner. Its evolution has been strongly correlated with capital flows, 
which (…) are subject to cyclical variations.” There is a “marked correlation between the real 
exchange rate and net capital flows for Latin America in average terms in the years dominated 
by the Washington Consensus. The procyclical behaviour of these flows is transmitted to the real 
exchange rate insofar as a boom has often caused sharp currency appreciations, which have 
repeatedly led to current account disequilibria through over- or undershooting in times of crisis” 
 
As in the previous case, the management of the real exchange rate is critical to secure stability. In 
the next section we will argue that a real exchange rate target may represent a policy rule more 
conducive to promote stability than pure inflation target.  
 
2.3. Real Exchange Rate Target 
 
We now assume a different institutional setting, in which the government pursues a real exchange 
rate target. A plausible rationale for this is that it follows an export-led growth strategy and 
therefore aims at avoiding any loss of international competitiveness derived from a fall in the real 
exchange rate. Such a strategy is very much in line with the insights provided by growth models 
based on the Kaldorian tradition and on the Balance-of-Payments constraint (McCombie and 
Thirlwall, 1994; León-Ledesma, 2002). Germany, South Korea and Brazil in the sixties and early   14 
seventies, and more recently China and Argentina
8, are examples of countries which in different 
periods embraced policies that sough to keep the exchange rate competitive.  
 
As in the previous case, the instrument to influence the exchange rate is an IROP: the government 
defines the nominal interest rate so as to make it compatible with the desired real exchange rate. 
In addition, the government acknowledges that in a globalized economy the domestic and the 
international  real  interest  rates  should  be  equal,  i.e.  p p - = - i i * * .  From  (18)  we  know 
that n vi q u - = p , where  q is the real exchange rate target. This allows us to find the nominal 
interest rate target ( n i ) that will produce the real exchange rate target (q ) along with the equality 
of the foreign and domestic interest rates. Formally: 
   










Note that in the previous section we used equations (18) and (19) to find the real exchange rate 
compatible with PPP and UIP. In this section we use the equality of the real interest rates to find 
the nominal interest rate compatible with the target for the real exchange rate
9.  
 
Equation (38) shows that if the real exchange rate is higher than the target ( q q > ), so is the 
nominal interest rate ( n n i i > ). Therefore the reaction function of the government – which is by 
assumption  committed  to  achieve  the  target  real  exchange  rate  using  an  IROP  --  can  be 
represented as follows (with  0 > x ): 
 




- =x  
 
And using equation (38) in (39):  
 
                                                 
8 Damill and Frenkel (2009) observed that the same type of policy, with significant effects on the rates of growth and 
external equilibrium, was adopted in Argentina since 2003 (although they point out that such a policy lost 
consistency after 2007).  
9 In terms of equation (15), perfect foresight implies  1 - = j  and  q q = .   15 



















We now have a new system of differential equations with d  and  n i as endogenous variables. One 
is equation (40), and the other is equation (41) below, which is a slightly modified equation for 
the dynamics of the debt to capital ratio (see also equation 13): 
 
(41)    [ ] ) ( ) ( * n n i g i q i q a m - - + - = p d d &  
 


























It is now easy to find the equilibrium growth and inflation rates: 
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The Jacobian of the system formed by equations (4) and (41) is as follows: 
 
















The stability condition (SC) defined by equation (26) can be rewritten as: 
 
(47)  0 ) ( ) ( * < - - = q g q q i SC
E E p     16 
 
The influence of an increase in the real exchange rate target on the stability of the system can be 
studied  by  taking  the  derivative  of  SC  with  respect  to  q in  equilibrium.  If  the  derivative  is 
negative, a real depreciation of the currency favors stability. In effect: 
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The rise in q  has two effects. One is to increase the burden of the debt in real terms: the country 
pays more interest on the external debt in terms of the domestic good.  for the same interests. The 
second effect is to foster competitiveness, leading to faster growth and hence to a lower debt to 
GDP  ratio.  If  ( ) Ba v u i < + - 1 * ,  the  second  effect  prevails  and  a  higher  real  exchange  rate 
makes the system more stable. We will assume that this condition holds. As a result, q should be 
higher than a critical value for the system to be stable. To find this critical value  c q , we use 
equations (42) –(45) in the stability condition (47): 
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>
1 *
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If the government sets the real exchange rate target bellow this critical value the system becomes 
unstable. As  in  the  case  of inflation  target,  in  a  small  open  economy  fully  integrated  to  the 
international  financial  markets,  the  real  exchange  rate  policy  critically  matters:  a  mistake  in 
managing this variable may give rise to a cumulative process of indebtedness and instability, 
depicted by the instability region in Figure 1. In this Figure the declivity with respect to  q of the   17 
second term of the SC ( Ba v u + +
-1 ) 1 ( ) is higher than i* and  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 * * < + + - - - v v C i Bm A p . 
These conditions allows for a positive value of  C q . 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Equation (50) also points out that an international shock raising the real foreign interest rate (due, 
for instance, to more turbulent times in the financial markets) will increase  c q  (from 
1
c q  to 
2
c q ). 
If this shock is strong  enough to  make  q qc > , then a real depreciation is required to avoid 
instability, shifting the  (see Figure 1). Inversely, industrial and technological policies aimed at 
enhancing non-price competitiveness (reducing m) give rise to a lower critical value of the real 
exchange rate. Thus, there are two complementary forms of restoring growth and stability in the 
context of a deterioration of the international conditions, namely increasing  q  or reducing m
10.   
 
If the government solely responds to the shock with a real depreciation, then conflict will be 
heightened  in  the labor market,  to the  extent  that  the  real exchange  rate  and  real  wages  are 
inversely related (Blecker, 1999). Unions will see this policy as an attempt to adjust the economy 
by exclusively penalizing workers. In addition, a higher real exchange target also implies having 
to  accept  higher  levels  of  inflation.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  government  responds  by 
strengthening the industrial and technology policies, a fall in m will soften the impact of the crisis 
on the labor market and the inflation rate.  
 
This  result  supports  the  idea,  suggested  by  several  authors,  that  industrial  and  technological 
policies are even more necessary in times of crisis than when the international markets work 
smoothly
11. Small open economies should have strong policies in favor of learning and structural 
change since they are much more vulnerable to changes in the international conditions
12. The 
successful  experiences  of  technological  and  industrial  catching-up  of  the  East  Asia  newly 
                                                 
10 For simplicity we focus on the effect of the industrial policy in m, but it should be noted that the effect on 
competitiveness may also occur through an increase in the parameter a.  
11 See Cimoli and Porcile (2009). 
12 An interesting work offering historical evidence on this point for the small European economies is Katzenstein 
(1985).  Razmi and Blecker (2008) suggest that changing the pattern of specialization may help to avoid the “fallacy 
of composition” – the impossibility that most countries could pursue at the same time an export-led growth strategy.    18 
industrialized countries are a well-known example of how growth and external stability have 
gone hand in hand with active industrial policies in open developing economies. These countries 
combined a competitive real exchange rate along with more equal patterns of income distribution 





In this paper we presented dynamic model with a view to identifying the conditions that may lead 
to instability in a small open developing economy under different monetary rules. In recent years 
many  developing  economies  have  become  more  integrated  to  the  international  markets  – 
particularly financial markets. They have also adopted policy rules based on inflation target and a 
fluctuating exchange rate regime (especially in Latin America). Alternatively, other developing 
economies (particularly China) have chosen to keep the real exchange rate at a (high) competitive 
level. In this paper we discuss the implications of these policy options for external debt stability.  
 
We show that an inflation target regime may give rise to stability but there are serious risks in 
focusing exclusively on inflation. If the central bank uses its relative autonomy to pursue an 
ambitiously too low inflation target, with no regard to the effects it produces on the real exchange 
rate, the loss of competitiveness may bring about an external crisis. Moreover, in a scenario 
featuring rational expectations and the equality of the domestic and foreign real interest rates, 
inflation target leads to instability. A second institutional scenario is defined by a policy rule that 
sets the interest rate in accordance with a real exchange rate target. If the government sets the real 
exchange rate at a level higher than a critical value, then the economy will achieve stability, even 
in the extreme case in which the real interest rates (foreign and domestic) are equal in the short 
run.  
 
In both cases, a close monitoring by the government of the evolution of the real exchange rate is 
necessary for avoiding  a downward  move below the critical level that compromises external 
                                                 
13 Prebisch (1981) offers a thought-provoking analysis of the role of active policies in reducing the negative impact 
of external crisis on growth and class conflict in the Latin American economies. The Latin American literature on the 
1982 debt crisis and the ensuing inflationary process highlighted how real devaluations heightened the intensity of 
the distributive conflict.  See also Porcile and Lima (2010).    19 
stability.  Moreover,  policies  in  the  technological  front  --  aimed  at  enhancing  non  price 
competitiveness -- can be a useful instrument to reduce the impact of the distributive conflict on 
the inflation rate and the real exchange rate.  In this sense concerns with short term stability 
should  not  neglect  the  need  of  long  term  policies  for  international  competitiveness.  On  the 
contrary, the latter can be seen as a condition for the success of the former. 
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